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Abstract
Based on Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT) we tested the hitherto unexplored assumption that irrationality as conceptualized 
by REBT (demandingness, self evaluation, low frustration tolerance), is associated with erroneous statistical reasoning. We assessed 
trait irrationality of 216 respondents and individual estimates of future winning probabilities in the context of the Wortman (1975) 
perceived control design. Results indicate that an increased (i.e., unrealistically optimistic) as well as a decreased (i.e., unrealistically 
pessimistic) estimation of future winnings is associated with irrationality. Findings substantiate an association between erroneous 
probability estimates and therapeutically relevant cognitions which do not imply any mathematical or statistical contents.
1. Introduction
According to the theory of Rational Emotive 
Behavior Therapy (REBT) by Albert Ellis (1962), the 
response to a certain event depends mainly on how 
this event is perceived and put in relation to an 
individual’s belief system. Rational beliefs are 
proposed to lead to adaptive emotions while 
irrational beliefs should lead to maladaptive 
emotions. Empirical evidence indicates that there 
is, indeed, a connection between irrationality and 
maladaptive emotions, such as anxiety and 
depression (e.g., Spörrle & Försterling, 2007). 
Irrationality as defined by REBT includes 
dimensions of absolutistic and demanding thoughts 
connecting personal achievements or failure with 
self-evaluation and low frustration tolerance. 
Neither in this theoretical definition nor in the scales 
measuring irrational thinking an association with 
statistical reasoning can be found even though, 
sometimes, the term irrationality is used in such 
fields of research (e.g., Gigerenzer, 2005).
This research aims at investigating a potential 
association between irrationality (as defined by 
REBT) and statistical reasoning given the fact that 
some aspects of irrationality contain illogical 
thinking which might be associated with erroneous  
probability estimations.
But next time, I will win: 
On the relation between irrationality and probability
estimates in a game of chance
3. Results
As in previous research (e.g., α = .59, Försterling & 
Bühner, 2003; α = .63, Spörrle, Welpe, Ringenberg, 
& Försterling, 2008) the 6IRBS did not reach 
satisfactory reliability (Cronbach’s α = .59).  
Overall, n = 21 persons assumed a probability 
below 50% to win the next game (group 1), the 
majority of n = 158 participants (group 2) exactly 
gave a value of 50% and n = 37 assumed a 
probability higher than 50% (group 3).
Comparing the mean irrationality values between 
these groups resulted in a significant overall effect, 
F(2, 213) = 3.71, p < .05. Post hoc LSD tests 
indicated that on average irrationality of group 1 (M
= 2.50, SD = 0.89) was significantly higher than 
irrationality in group 2 (M = 2.07, SD = 0.83, p < 
.05). Moreover, irrationality of group 3 (M = 2.35, SD
= 0.73) was, on average, marginally significantly 
higher than irrationality in group 2, p < .07 (see 
Figure 1 for mean values of these three groups).
A visual inspection on single item levels indicates 
that this trend can be found for the majority of items 
(see Figure 2 to 7).
Figure 1. 6IRBS total score (including 90% confidence interval) 
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Figure 2. Item 1: Sometimes, events happen 
that are not only uncomfortable but that are 
catastrophic and awful. (including 90% 
confidence interval) 
Figure 3. Item 2: I must do things that are 
important to me – perfectly. (including 90% 
confidence interval) 
Items of the 6IRBS
Figure 4. Item 3: I direly need the approval of 
others. (including 90% confidence interval) 
Figure 5. Item 4: I cannot stand frustration. 
(including 90% confidence interval) 
Figure 6. Item 5: After I did something wrong, 
I frequently think that I am a failure. (including 
90% confidence interval) 
Figure 7. Item 6: There are some humans 
who are worthwhile and others that are 
worthless. (including 90% confidence interval)
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4. Discussion
Results provide a first and preliminary evidence 
that irrationality as conceptualized by REBT might 
be associated with unrealistic frequency estimates: 
People who over- or underestimate the probability 
of winning in a game of chance showed higher 
levels of irrationality.
Analysis based on single items indicate that this 
trend can be found for several irrationality 
dimensions (e.g., low frustration tolerance, self-
evaluation), but  might not exist for demandingness
(see Item 2).
Future studies should replicate this finding by using 
more reliable scales in order to find out which 
aspects of irrationality are associated with 
erroneous probability-based statistical thinking.
2. Method
Sample: A total of 216 participants with age ranging 
from 16 to 81 years (M = 27.71, SD = 10.71) took 
part in the study (47.2% men, 52.8% women). 
Among participants were 118 students, 50 
employees, 20 self-employed persons, and 16 
pupils, the rest had other forms of employment or 
did not provide an answer. 
Participants were individually approached on the 
campus of the authors‘ university or in the authors‘
private settings. They received a candy bar as 
reward, student participants additionally received 
credit points for taking part in this study.
Procedure: Participants took part in an experimental 
study based on the classical Wortman (1975) 
paradigm in which they had to draw a marble with a 
50% chance of winning. After having won or lost this 
game respondents should estimate their probability 
of winning when drawing a marble again.
Before taking part in the game respondents filled out 
the Six Irrational Beliefs (6IRBS; Försterling & 
Bühner, 2003).
